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Abstract
All introduced natural enemies present a degree of risk to nontarget species. Since most biological control programs use relatively
host-speciWc natural enemies, the risk to nontarget species is generally very low, particularly from biological control of weeds, which uses
extensively tested and validated host-speciWcity testing procedures to predict risk. However, many of the published comments about risks
of biological control are superWcial or misleading, often inappropriately lumping risk from all taxa of agents as “the risk of biological
control,” and ignore the potential beneWts, rather than dealing with species-by-species risk and beneWts. Particularly confounding accurate predictions is the common mixing of parameters of hazard and exposure in discussions of risk. In this paper, traditional risk analysis
techniques are discussed and adapted for biological control. How people perceive risk is the key to understanding their attitude to risk.
Some of the criticisms of biological control relating to inadequate post-release monitoring are valid and the ethical responsibilities of biological control scientists in this area are also discussed. Biological control scientists should address objectively the criticisms of biological
control, continue to review and adjust current host-speciWcity testing procedures and make appropriate changes. This process will result
in better science, ultimately delivering more focused programs, and altering the perception of risk from biological control agents by objective observers.
Published by Elsevier Inc.
Keywords: Biological control; Risk analysis; Hazard; Exposure; Risk perception; Risk assessment; Ethics

1. Introduction
In this paper, I examine risk and ethics in biological control, to demonstrate the social responsibility of scientists
who have been trained in biological control. Increased
focus on these issues can be used to expand biological control research, to document programs more completely, and
to communicate results of the programs more widely.
Biological control is a pest management tactic that utilizes deliberate introduction of living natural enemies to
lower the population level of invasive pests (DeBach, 1974;
DeBach and Rosen, 1991; HuVaker and Messenger, 1976;
Van Driesche and Bellows, 1996). Biological control is not
a panacea and is not risk-free (Delfosse, 2000). There are
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pest management needs and situations where, clearly,
another strategy is more appropriate or should have higher
priority. For example, if a new, potentially invasive pest is
found in a localized area, the appropriate strategy is eradication with pesticides. Also, biological control is a strategic
process with limited use in emergency pest control programs. However, for widely established pests, or for those
with the potential to become widespread but are at an early
stage of invasion (but beyond the point of eradication), biological control is often the most appropriate strategy.
Every biological control agent that has ever been used
has associated risk. The quantiWcation of that risk is a very
challenging and diYcult activity, which has been the subject
of extensive research and discussion (Andersen et al., 2005;
Lonsdale et al., 2001; McFadyen, 1998; Wapshere et al.,
1989; Waterhouse, 1999; Wright et al., 2005). In fact, the
history of biological control has seen an evolution from no
testing of agents, to testing important crops in a region, to
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selecting test plant species based on a scientiWc centrifugal
phylogenetic testing procedure, to focusing on relatedness
and physiological and ecological host range. However,
many of the published discussions about biological control
risk do not seem to be informed by knowledge of this history, or of the biological control process. Often, discussions
have been superWcial or misleading; a common error is to
talk about “the risk from using biological control,” grouping risk from all agent taxa. Additionally, the potential beneWts of biological control should be discussed. If not, the
analysis can be misleading, because ignoring environmental
and economic beneWts of biological control is clearly as
unreasonable as ignoring associated risks. Decisions to
implement biological control should be made in as full a
context of beneWts and risks as is available (Jetter, 2005;
Sheppard et al., 2003). Thus, I lead oV with a general discussion of risk analysis, which I reWne for use with biological
control agents.
A highly developed sense of environmental ethics has
always been inherent in how biological control ecologists
operate, but until recently, has been rarely discussed outside
of scientiWc meetings. Thus, of many possible topics in this
area, I discuss, unanticipated consequences, conXict-ofinterest, post-release monitoring, and the do-nothing
option. Finally, release of Rhinocyllus conicus Frölich
(Coleoptera: Curculionidae) against nodding thistle (Carduus nutans L.; Asteraceae) is discussed as a case history,
because it is used by diVerent groups and individuals either
as an example of a well-planned and conducted program,
or one where risk to nontarget species was not adequately
considered before release.
2. Risk and biological control
Risk is a relative concept used to imply uncertainty, and
estimates and perceptions of risk change as knowledge
improves. Risk can be expressed as the interaction between
hazard and exposure (Davis, 1996; Molak, 1997a; NAS,
1983). A conclusion that an adverse eVect has occurred or
could occur (see below) that is the basis of a perception of
risk is a highly subjective value judgment. Importantly, the
perception of risk is not necessarily in proportion to the
actual risk; in fact, for risk in general, the perception is
often higher than the reality. Risk is therefore often used
when uncertainty can be quantiWed to some degree. When
there is uncertainty about whether a hazard exists, there is a
probability at some level that it does exist, presenting a risk
(Wilson and Shlyakhter, 1997; Wilson et al., 1985). It is the
role of the risk assessor to quantify this risk and estimate
the imprecision. An uncertain risk suggests a paradox and a
contradiction (Wilson and Shlyakhter, 1997) in cases where
the existence of a hazard has not been established. This is
often the case in biological control.
Acceptable risk is used when uncertainty is quantiWed to
the subjective satisfaction of a viewer. Uncertainty is measured by the deviation from expected values which are also
subjective and diYcult to quantify. Thus, when probabili-

ties of diVerent outcomes are unknown, uncertainty is
transformed into risk, where probabilities of outcomes are
weighted according to their likelihood of occurrence.
Irreversible actions and option value are important to
consider when evaluating risk in a biological control program. An irreversible action is one that limits future
options. Option value arises from retaining an option to a
good or service (including, for example, both the target species and potential nontarget species) for which future
demand is uncertain. Option value could be compromised if
biological control of a target species is successful, and if a
use for the species is developed subsequently (e.g., the development of a weed as a herbal product, or the loss of Xoral
beauty in a landscape, albeit by an invasive weed, which
may be unknown to a casual observer). Option value is also
aVected by the risk premium, the amount people would be
willing to pay to avoid the risk of not having something
(such as the nontarget species) available to them which they
may want in the future (over the expected value to them).
Quasi-option value measures expected value of future information; i.e., beneWts of delaying a decision when an alternative involves an irreversible action (such as biological
control agent introduction) and there is uncertainty about
the future beneWts of alternatives (such as for use in habitat
conservation, commercially, endangered species restoration, etc.).
In general, the greater the potential beneWts, the greater
the acceptable risk, as long as the beneWts are not available
through another activity that poses less risk (Swaney, 1997).
This is a key point in deciding which integrated pest management (IPM) strategy to use, including biological control.
Thus, in any predecision analysis, it is important to estimate potential beneWts of using a strategy as well as the
potential risks.
2.1. Risk analysis
Risk analysis is a tool, and like other areas of science,
has limitations when dealing with “essentially complex phenomena” (Hayek, 1991). Risk analysis is comprised of risk
assessment, risk management and risk communication (Ahl
et al., 1993). Molak (1997a) is an excellent resource for risk
analysis procedures and examples. Risk analysis should be
a transparent public process, with all assumptions and
parameters clearly stated (MacDiarmid, 1997; Molak,
1997b). I agree with the statement that “The thought process that goes into evaluating a particular hazard is more
important than the application of some sophisticated mathematical technique or formula, which may often be based
on erroneous assumptions or models of the world” (Molak,
1997b).
In risk analysis, probabilities of possible outcomes are
estimated (Molak, 1997a). For biological control, the
adverse eVect is damage (anticipated or not) to a nontarget
species from a biological control agent. Understanding the
nature of this damage is the key, and there is a continuum
of type, extent, temporal, and spatial aspects of damage
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that must be considered (Delfosse et al., 1995; Hasan et al.,
1992).
For example, exploratory nibbling by an arthropod, or
development of a few tiny sori of a rust fungus on a leaf,
producing a small number of nonviable spores are, arguably, “adverse eVects,” but have no measurable negative
population eVects on the nontarget species, and do not
place that population at signiWcant risk. Transitory damage
by a biological control agent on a nontarget species that is
in the agent’s physiological host range also does not present
a signiWcant risk to the nontarget species (Delfosse, 2004).
Such transitory damage only occurs during the exponential
growth phase of the agent, but disappears once the agent
and its target reach equilibrium. This emphasizes the essential value of host-speciWcity testing at identifying cases of
likely transitory damage as part of a risk analysis for a biological control agent.
Risk analysis is a “body of knowledge (methodology)
that evaluates and derives a probability of an adverse
eVect of an agent (chemical, physical, or other), industrial
process, technology, or natural process” (Molak, 1997b).
Most practitioners believe that risk assessment should be
separate from risk management (Ruckleshaus, 1985; Sutter, 1993). Risk communication to the nontechnical community is often the most ignored step in the process (see
below).
Analysis of risk from biological control is an example of
an ecological risk analysis (Lackey, 1997). As Lackey (1997)
points out, a “formidable problem ƒ is selecting what ecological component or system is to be considered at risk.
This selection is entirely social and political, but estimating
the actual risk is technical and scientiWc.” The selection of
what is potentially at risk can be somewhat less complicated in biological control, because biological control scientists have always concentrated on trying to predict the risk
to nontarget species (including potential indirect risks to
species which rely on the nontarget species). However, the
estimation and acceptance of the risk can be enormously
complicated, as with biological control of saltcedar
(Tamarix spp., Tamaricaceae) in the United States (DeLoach et al., 2000).
NAS (1983) identiWed four common elements in risk
analysis: (1) hazard (agent) identiWcation; (2) dose–
response; (3) exposure analysis; and (4) risk characterization. In the risk characterization phase, data from the three
previous steps are analyzed, assumptions are stated, and
calculations and conclusions are made.
Recommendations for risk management and risk communication can then often be made. The NAS (1983) procedure deals essentially with human exposure to toxic
substances, which is, of course, generally inappropriate for
biological control (the major exception being the possibility
of the rearing process of some augmentative biological control agent possibly producing airborne hairs or scales which
are potential allergens). Thus, I suggest the following modiWcations of the NAS (1983) process to deal speciWcally with
risk analysis of biological control agents:
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2.1.1. Hazard identiWcation
For biological control, I have deWned hazard as the
innate capacity of a biological control agent to cause harm
(Delfosse, 2003); i.e., potential damage to nontarget species.
There are important questions to ask in this context. Does
the biological control agent cause the adverse eVect? Is causality demonstrated (see below)? What else could cause or
contribute to the adverse eVect? Just because we are dealing
with complex ecological systems and some type and level of
harm to a population of a nontarget species occurs after the
release of a biological control agent does not mean that
harm was caused by the biological control agent.
2.1.2. Dose–response relationship
What is the relationship between the population level
and incidence of a biological control agent and the adverse
eVect? Is nontarget damage a transitory eVect that was predicted from host-speciWcity testing and is likely to disappear once a future equilibrium is reached? Are there data
available that indicate something else?
2.1.3. Exposure analysis
What current or future exposures are anticipated in all
habitats where the host or potential nontarget species
occur? What phenological, temporal, spatial, edaphic, climatological, or other features may mediate exposure?
2.1.4. Risk characterization
Given the information from the Wrst three points in the
risk analysis process, what is the estimated incidence of the
adverse eVect in a given population? What other information is needed? Does the physiological host range determined by host-speciWcity testing predict accurately the
ecological host range?
2.2. Risk assessment
Risk assessment is “risk analysis applied in a particular
situation” (Molak, 1997b). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1992) deWnes ecological risk
assessment as “the process that evaluates the likelihood
that adverse ecological eVects are occurring, or may
occur, as a result of exposure to one or more stressors.”
Given the complexity of ecological systems, it is not an
easy matter to adapt risk assessment techniques to ecological systems (Lackey, 1994) such as biological control,
and some researchers do not accept that risk assessment
should even be used (Merrell and Van Strumm, 1990).
However, “use of risk assessment to help solve ecological
problems is widely supported” (Lackey, 1997). Environmental risk assessments can be qualitative (“low,”
“medium,” or “high”) or quantitative (e.g., “a probability
of 0.001” for a given parameter). For biological control,
risk assessment examines primarily the potential adverse
eVects of the introduction of a biological control agent on
nontarget species, but can be expanded to include other
aspects of the environment. Closely linked to risk assess-
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ment, of course, are global regulatory policies and procedures that can facilitate (the facilitator model) or impede
(the gatekeeper model) an unbiased review and rapid
approval of suYciently host-speciWc natural enemies
(Barratt and Moeed, 2005; Delfosse, 2004; Sheppard
et al., 2003).
2.3. Risk management
Risk management identiWes and implements strategies to
reduce risk to an acceptable level. The “mitigation” clauses
that are sometimes included in regulatory protocols are
essentially risk management tools. Currently the emphasis
by regulatory bodies dealing with classical biological control in the United States is primarily on risk assessment, not
risk management or risk communication (e.g., APHIS,
2000; AQIS, 2000; NAPPO, 2000).

2.5. Other useful analyses
Several other techniques are available for risk analysis
that are of fundamental importance to biological control,
many of which incorporate beneWt analysis. However, a
detailed discussion of these techniques is beyond the scope
of this paper, so readers are directed to Bier (1997), Lackey
(1997), Swaney (1997), and Vose (1997) for a review of
some techniques. The following techniques are some of the
options.
2.5.1. Probabilistic risk analysis
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) (Bier, 1997) has particular applications for biological control. PRA asks three
basic questions (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981): (1) what can
go wrong (a hazard identiWcation)?; (2) how likely is it to go
wrong (a likelihood identiWcation)?; and (3) what will be
the consequences if it does (a consequences identiWcation)?

2.4. Risk communication
Objective communication of risk to the general public
is the least-developed part of the risk analysis process for
biological control. Biological control scientists communicate the risks of biological control very well to colleagues
through publications, scientiWc and public meetings, etc.,
and to regulatory oYcials through permits for importation and release of agents, but not very well in general to
the public. The beneWts of biological control are almost
never mentioned in this context; thus there is a bias in
favor of perceived risk that can be higher than actual risk.
This should be of considerable concern to biological control scientists and beneWciaries of research on biological
control, because often biological control is the best
available strategy to manage an invasive pest—sometimes the only sustainable and aVordable strategy (Delfosse, 2000).
Unfortunately, generalizations about biological control
risk have emerged, and can temporarily outweigh over 130
years of mostly safe and eVective biological control. Scientists trained in biological control Wnd it frustrating that it is
the negative aspects of biological control that are communicated and receive the most widespread attention (Gagné
and Howarth, 1985; Hamilton, 2000; Howarth, 1983, 1985,
1991; Louda et al., 1997; Miller and Aplet, 1993; SimberloV,
1992; SimberloV and Stiling, 1996; Stolzenburg, 1999;
Strong, 1997; Zimmerman, 1958, 1978). Sometimes, this
information is incomplete (beneWts are glossed over or
ignored, the literature cited is selective, perceived risk is
stressed, biological control process not articulated clearly,
etc.), inaccurate (perceived risk from a speciWc natural
enemy is extrapolated to risk from all biological control), or
based on anecdotal information and speculations from limited data. This is diYcult to counter, but scientists trained in
biological control need to take the lead to discuss objectively the beneWts of biological control, as well as the risks,
and the careful process that is followed (e.g., Lonsdale et al.,
2001; Sheppard et al., 2003).

2.5.2. Risk-beneWt analysis
Risk-beneWt analysis (RBA) is well established in both
policy [the U.S. Food and Drug Administration uses RBA
“when it expedites the approval of drugs for critical care
circumstances;” (Swaney, 1997)], and law [the Toxic Substances Control Act requires the EPA to consider beneWts
and risks of chemicals (Callan and Thomas, 1996)]. The
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act requires
EPA to regulate pesticides on a risk-beneWt standard, balancing “the economic, social, and environmental costs, as
well as the potential beneWts of the use of any pesticide.”
2.5.3. Comparative risk analysis
Comparative risk analysis (CRA) ranks risks for the
magnitude of the threats they pose to ecosystems (or to
another factor), helps identify undermanaged risks, and
combines expert and public opinion.
2.5.4. BeneWt-cost analysis
BeneWt-cost analysis (BCA) produces a “present-value”
measure of the net beneWts of a proposed action, such as
release of a biological control agent, and when combined
with sensitivity analysis, produces a range of net-beneWt
values useful in determining the impact of discount rates on
estimation of net beneWts. However, BCA results in a single
number that doesn’t indicate the degree of uncertainty, the
range of expected values, or attitude toward risk. The past
trends of biological control, indicating an overwhelmingly
safe record (Waterhouse, 1999) could be useful in BCA.
2.5.5. Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis can also be used to address risk and
uncertainty. EVects of diVerent assumptions about key variables are examined. In sensitivity analysis, optimistic and
pessimistic values indicate which variables will have greatest eVects on beneWts and costs. This procedure yields crucial variables, not probabilities. Each potential outcome is
weighted by its probability of occurrence (by past trends,
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subjective judgments, experimentation, etc.); and the
weighted outcomes are summed to arrive at a mean, or
expected, value.
2.5.6. Cost-eVectiveness analysis
Cost-eVectiveness analysis (CEA) helps identify “the
least costly route to the speciWed goal” (Swaney, 1997).
Such a goal could be, for example, management of an invasive pest species. These economic analyses deal with opportunity cost, the value of the next-best use of a resource
measured as foregone alternative beneWts (Swaney, 1997).
CEA has not yet been employed in biological control, but
oVers potentially a useful way to quantify the economic
beneWts of biological control.
2.6. Causality
Causality should be examined critically and objectively
when assessing the risk from biological control. For example, too often the glib statement, “absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence” is sometimes used uncritically in spite
of the total lack of supporting facts. The statement has been
applied to biological control (and to other Welds, e.g.,
Anderson, 2004). It could equally be said by those who
want to believe that there are no or minimal eVects from
release of biological control agents that “absence of evidence is not evidence of presence.” However, these types of
emotive statements should be avoided, because they add
nothing to the positive discussion that is emerging by the
majority of scientists who want to Wnd out what is actually
happening in the Weld, and to use the data to improve the
biological control process.
The U.S. EPA (1989), Gibb (1991), and Rothman (1986)
provided causality guidelines for dealing with cancer risk
assessment, which I have modiWed to deal with biological
control. In this process, care must be taken to avoid post
hoc ergo prompter hoc (after this, because of this), a common logical fallacy (Hardin, 1998).
2.6.1. Compounding
Could the adverse eVect be a result of compounding,
which is attributing the adverse eVect to one study variable,
when the true cause is another variable (“absence of evidence ƒ”)?
2.6.2. Bias
Was bias present, for example in the way data were
obtained or evaluated (Smith, 1995)?
2.6.3. Statistics
Was the analysis appropriate and complete, and was a
description of the methods provided?
2.6.4. Temporal and spatial relationships
Was the biological control agent in the Weld at speciWc
sites for a suYciently long period to have developed a population level high enough to cause the alleged adverse
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eVect? Is the eVect transitory, and if so, is this an acceptable
risk to the nontarget species?
2.6.5. Consistency
Did the same adverse eVect occur at multiple sites? If
not, what features of the site(s) where the adverse eVect is
alleged to occur contributed to the result? Will this occur
into the future, or is the adverse eVect likely to be transitional?
2.6.6. Magnitude of adverse eVect
Causality is more credible when the risk is large and precise. Is the perceived adverse eVect from a biological control
agent limited to factors such as insigniWcant nibbling by a
phytophagous arthropod that presents no population-level
impacts to a nontarget species, or does it involve signiWcant,
long-term, population-level impacts on reproduction, survival, etc., of a nontarget species?
2.6.7. SpeciWcity of the association
Most biological control agents are speciWc to a target
organism, or to a small group of closely related organisms.
If the adverse eVect is alleged to occur on a distantly related
species, the situation should be examined particularly carefully. Has causality been established (“absence of evidence
ƒ”)?
2.6.8. Biological plausibility
Does the association of agent and perceived adverse
eVect make biological sense with respect to phenology, ecology, physiology, temporal, and spatial distribution, edaphic
characteristics, weather, metabolism of target, and nontarget species, etc.?
2.6.9. Coherence
Are cause and eVect in logical agreement with everything
known about the agent, the target, and the system in which
the adverse eVect is alleged to occur? How does personal
bias, both by pro- and anti-biological control advocates,
aVect coherence?
2.7. The nature of risk from biological control
Release of a classical biological control agent is a type of
irreversible action; if the agent becomes established, it is
unlikely to be able to be recalled. A biological control agent
could limit the option value of the target species and of any
nontarget species that are in its ecological host range. Thus,
assessment of the potential risk from biological control is
not simple, and oversimpliWcation can lead to erroneous
conclusions. The crucial variable of risk (and most fears) in
biological control is measured by assumption of potential
damage to valued nontarget species.
The damage to a nontarget species could be direct, for
example, feeding by a biological control agent on a valued
native plant (Louda et al., 1997), or indirect, by assumption
of loss of a resource if biological control is successful, such
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as loss of pollen of a plant that is a weed to part of society
and a valued resource to another, as in the Echium plantagineum L. (Boraginaceae) situation in Australia (Cullen and
Delfosse, 1985; Delfosse, 1990; Wapshere et al., 1989).
However, it is diYcult to isolate the exclusive impact of
potential risk by agents on nontarget species (“absence of
evidence ƒ”). Environmental factors other than natural
enemies inXuence risk, and if omitted, bias estimates of risk
due to biological control (“after this, because of this”).
When determining the risk to a nontarget species from a
biological control agent, several other factors come into
play.
First, generalizations about “the risk from biological
control” are meaningless and misleading. It is always incorrect to lump risk from diVerent taxa, trophic levels, etc., of
biological control agents and to present this imaginary
Wgure as “the risk from biological control.” Clearly, a
polyphagous predator does not present the same risk to
nontarget species as a macrocyclic, autoecious rust fungus.
Unless speciWc information on the agent and target is available and used from a known site, the variability becomes
part of all the other uncertainties of a risk calculation.
Second, prior information can be useful in starting a risk
assessment for a new biological control agent. For example,
what is the level of speciWcity displayed by other members
of the genus? Have other members of the same genus been
used without causing nontarget damage? What is the
nature of the nontarget damage that is produced—from
nibbling on leaves of a target plant without oviposition, to
heavy feeding, oviposition, and complete development similar to that on the target species? Is the damage transitory?
Uncertainty diminishes with information gathered from
research.
Third, expert judgment can help to estimate uncertainties in some cases (e.g., Evans et al., 1994a,b; Lackey, 1997),
but “must be used with caution because experts are often
overconWdent” (Wilson and Shlyakhter, 1997; see also Henrion and FischoV, 1986; Morgan and Henrion, 1990;
Cooke, 1991). The perception of uncertainty can even
increase as more research is conducted on a given subject
(Morgan et al., 1984; Morgan and Keith, 1995), possibly
because the probability judgments are attached to descriptions of events, not to the events themselves (Tversky and
Koehler, 1994). This is clearly the case with biological control; the more that is known about a potential biological
control agent, the higher the regulatory burden.
Finally, adverse eVects are of course, often, subjective
(Molak, 1997b), and determined by society. However, as
with the Rhinocyllus–Cirsium example below, society’s
interpretation of adverse eVects is not necessarily consistent
over time or space, or with diVerent groups of stakeholders.
Behavior leading to conXicts-of-interest in choice of targets
and agents is key to understanding the perceived value of
potential adverse eVects (Cullen and Delfosse, 1985; Pemberton, 2002). The potential beneWts of biological control
are often lost in this context, which also bias objective decisions, so it is important to conduct a BCA along with the

risk assessment. Unfortunately, economists and sociologists
are not often available to conduct a BCA.
3. Ethics and biological control
The ethics of biological control scientists has been challenged by some critics of biological control. Occasionally,
moralistic, relativistic, motivational, or situational ethics is
used, where emotion-laden terms are employed for rejection of an action such as releasing a biological control
agent, often looking to the past. What is needed is, of
course, consequentialist ethics, where all reasonable alternatives are listed, and an observer chooses objectively
among them, and comparing consequences of actions,
looking to the future (Hardin, 1998).
Ethics of biological control have not often been explicitly discussed in the scientiWc literature. One exception is
presented in a Special Issue of Agriculture and Human Values. In this volume, Lockwood (1997) proposed major ethical questions dealing with regulation and implementation
of biological control “in the face of persistent ecological
uncertainty regarding environmental impacts;” balancing
beneWts and risks; development of policies and decisionmaking; sharing beneWts and costs of biological control;
and justiWcation for biological control as a replacement for
pesticides or as part of a “reconceptualization of agricultural production.” Even though the point about “persistent ecological uncertainty regarding environmental
impacts” could certainly be challenged, and few biological
control scientists would regard biological control as simply
a replacement for pesticides, the volume raises important
issues. Discussions of host-speciWcity testing (Van Driesche and Hoddle, 1997); environmental impacts of biological control in Hawaii (Duan and Messing, 1997);
genetically engineered plants (James, 1997); assessment of
fungal agents (Ricard and Ricard, 1997); institutional
obstacles (Jennings, 1997); the decision-making process
(Wilkinson and Fitzgerald, 1997); implementation in Central America (Bentley and O’Neil, 1997) and Cuba (Rosset,
1997); and biological control in the context of the philosophy of agriculture and global resources (Altieri et al.,
1997).
The context for biological control is often not considered by those who challenge the process. Scientists trained
in biological control do not propose introduction of primary landscape-changing organisms; this has already been
done, deliberately, accidentally, or naively, and these invasive species are estimated to cost over $122 billion per year
in the United States (Pimentel, 2002). Biological control scientists propose introduction of host-speciWc natural enemies of pests, after careful study, risk assessment, and
prediction/anticipation of likely consequences, to solve
severe and increasing damaging ecological and economic
problems. Many citizens and stakeholder groups (e.g.,
Callahan, 1999) choose biological control of many of these
invasive species over other pest management strategies,
accepting the small risk involved.
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Some biological control scientists have been surprised at
the vehemence with which biological control has been challenged (Hamilton, 2000; Howarth, 1991; Louda et al., 1997,
2003; Miller and Aplet, 1993; Pearson and Callaway, 2003;
SimberloV, 1992; SimberloV and Stiling, 1996; Stolzenburg,
1999; Strong, 1997). After all, many argue, biological control is the “white hat” of applied ecology. For example,
only eight of 350+ weed biological control agents have
caused any recorded nontarget damage in 130 years of
work (Waterhouse, 1999). It is interesting to note that it is
usually people who are not trained in biological control,
and who do not own or manage land degraded by invasive
species, who are most critical of biological control.
Many biological control scientists feel that regulators
are slow to adopt changes in regulations and procedures,
and do not always base their decisions on the best available
science (Delfosse, 2004; Sheppard et al., 2003). This criticism must be placed in context. Globally, regulators are
often hindered by having to regulate biological control by
suites of laws passed for other reasons, many of which were
passed early- to mid-last century.
At a time when biological control is needed more than
ever, this is certainly a challenging context in which to practice biological control! I discuss below some of the current
ethical challenges.
3.1. Post-release monitoring
It is unethical to release biological control agents without monitoring their impacts on target and closely related
nontarget species. Post-release monitoring, however, has
been the most neglected part of biological control programs, particularly in the United States, due to political,
Wnancial, and philosophical constraints. Potential nontarget species in the area of release should be identiWed, and
studied along with the target species (e.g. Denslow and
D’Antonio, 2005; Dudley and Kazmer, 2005). Where monitoring is a major feature of biological control programs,
refutable hypotheses are tested, and much is learned about
interactions of natural enemies, targets and the systems in
which they operate.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
Research Service (USDA-ARS) has recently changed its
biological control of weeds policy (Delfosse, 2000), implementing Wve key points:
1. each project is considered to last at least 20 years,
although individual components may take only 3–5
years, and a long-term strategic plan will be prepared for
each new target species;
2. post-release monitoring on the target is required;
3. potential nontarget species (identiWed through hostspeciWcity test results and other ecological procedures) in
the area of release will be identiWed, and potential
impacts will be studied on them as for the target species;
4. cultural control/revegetation will be considered wherever possible and appropriate, to increase stress on the
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weed population and maximize the likelihood that beneWcial Xora rather than weeds is the outcome; and
5. partnerships will be sought to increase technology transfer and to ensure that research areas in which ARS does
not have expertise (e.g., potential impacts on birds, as
with the Tamarix program; DeLoach et al., 2000) are
included.
3.2. Revenge eVects
Mertin (1936) introduced the term unanticipated consequences of actions. Tenner (1997) changed the phrase to
unintended consequences of technology and science. Predictability is critical to this process and has resulted in an anticipation of revenge eVects. Some ecologists argue that we
cannot predict the consequences of introduction of biological control agents. Further, if we cannot predict likely consequences, we should not make introductions of biological
control agents. However, 130 years of biological control of
weeds research indicates clearly that we can make projections of present trends vis-à-vis consequences with a high
degree of certainty (McFadyen, 1998; Wapshere et al., 1989;
Waterhouse, 1999).
The discussion of “after this, because of this” (see the
discussion on causality, above) should be kept in mind.
Ecological systems do not deal in one cause leading to one
eVect forever, because “we can never do merely one thing”
(Hardin, 1998).
Biological control researchers must continue to develop
and improve host-speciWcity testing protocols to improve
the prediction of the ecological host range by physiological
host-speciWcity testing (e.g., Briese, 2005; Delfosse, 2000;
Sheppard et al., 2005), including using f1 sterility and expert
systems.
3.3. ConXict-of-interest in biological control
ConXict-of-interest in biological control arises from
three main categories (Cullen and Delfosse, 1985): choice of
targets for biological control programs; choice of biological
control agents for targets; and resource allocation decisions
(e.g., chemical vs. biological). In the most intense conXict,
that over biological control of E. plantagineum in Australia
(Cullen and Delfosse, 1985), a legal injunction held up the
program for over 8.5 years. McFadyen (1998) presented
several other cases of conXict-of-interest in biological control. The key issue is that biological control scientists have
led the way in identifying and resolving these conXicts, and
this should and will continue.
3.4. The “do-nothing” response
The positive direct and indirect eVects from biological
control are often omitted or downplayed in discussions of
risk from a biological control agent, and it is sometimes proposed that we should “do nothing” until complete information is at hand. Incomplete information complicates
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objective estimates of risk because the nature and extent of
actual risk is not understood, so the subjective valuation of
risk is biased, and usually overstated. However, the “donothing” option also has risks, and is unrealistic and dangerous, because nothing never happens (Hardin, 1998). Thus,
there can be an equal or greater risk to nontarget species
from not using biological control as the base strategy of
IPM.
However, it is diYcult to isolate the exclusive impact of
potential risk by agents on nontarget species. Environmental factors other than natural enemies inXuence risk, and if
omitted, bias (overestimate) estimates of risk due to biological control. A complete risk analysis of the alternatives can
help decide if biological control should be used for a given
pest situation.
4. Case history: biological control of nodding thistle, Carduus
nutans
Rhinocyllus conicus is a Eurasian weevil that has been
introduced into North America for biological control of
thistles (Julien and GriYths, 1999). Found during surveys
in the 1960s, it was the primary potential biological control
agent for invasive Carduus spp. weeds. R. conicus was
extensively tested for host-speciWcity, starting in the early
1960s (and subsequently), and has been approved for
release in Wve countries where Carduus spp. are weeds
(Julien and GriYths, 1999). Adults feed on stems and
foliage and oviposit in capitula, and larvae feed internally
on the receptacle.
The risk assessment process for R. conicus was remarkably complete, especially considering that the host-speciWcity testing was completed 32 years ago. R. conicus was
found to be extremely speciWc to a small group of closely
related Carduine Eurasian thistles, primarily Carduus and
Cirsium. Cirsium has native North American and introduced Eurasian species; some native and all introduced species are weedy.
Application for release of R. conicus was submitted to a
Federal-State review committee in 1967. It was clearly
stated that both native and introduced Cirsium spp. were
likely to support development of R. conicus (Schroeder,
1980; Zwölfer, 1967; Zwölfer and Harris, 1984). The release
proposal was extensively peer reviewed by Federal, State,
and international colleagues: USDA-ARS, USDA-Forest
Service, U.S. Department of Interior (Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Land Management and Fish and Wildlife
Service), and Canada. It was unanimously agreed to accept
the risk to native Cirsium spp. given the potential to help
manage Carduus, a major weed. Thus, as is their responsibility, the reviewers recommended release of R. conicus on
behalf of society at large.
Following release, R. conicus established readily, spread
by itself, and was also redistributed widely by cooperators .
R. conicus severely impacted Carduus thistles and contributes signiWcantly to their management. Impact on native
Cirsium spp. has been detected (Louda et al., 1997), as was

predicted in the 1960s (Boldt, 1997). Of course, being able
to predict the precise magnitude or extent of nontarget damage is not possible or needed, and if this became a requirement, it would stop biological control, as well as a lot of
other Weld research.
What does the risk analysis process contribute to this
example? From the host-speciWcity testing it was known
and communicated that there is a qualitative risk that
native and introduced Cirsium spp. may be attacked at a
given Weld site. There is a phenology of events that must
occur for the attack to be signiWcant, and for the native Cirsium population to be placed at risk. Although the risk
assessment process starts with attack by a single weevil on a
single plant, it is important to note that it is the population
level, not the individual plant level, that is important in
such risk assessments.
This attack can be quantiWed using several agent-based
parameters: adult feeding on plant parts, oviposition, eclosion, larval feeding, pupation; emergence, additional adult
feeding, mating, etc., with each parameter having sublevels
that must be met before the next stage in the phenology of
attack can be achieved. There is also a similar complex
plant phenology that must be matched with the agent phenology for a signiWcant risk to be presented to the plant
population Louda et al. (1997) has provided a very valuable
start to the analysis of this interaction.
This is an interesting example of changing societal values. Risk and uncertainty have diVerent qualitative meanings at diVerent times (Wilson and Shlyakhter, 1997). For
example, potential damage to native Cirsium thistles was
accepted when the application for release of the weevil R.
conicus was made because the native thistles were not valued highly (some are still considered to be native weeds;
Boldt, 1997) and the weed (nodding thistle) was a major
invasive species. In fact, R. conicus has done exactly as the
host-speciWcity testing predicted, but the system is being
examined in the light of a new societal value for native thistles (Louda et al., 1997; Stolzenburg, 1999; Strong, 1997).
As a result of these changing societal values, biological control is being criticized inappropriately. A key philosophical
question arises: is it fair to judge a decision that was reasonable at some time in the past on society’s current standards?
Also, what other changes in the complex ecological systems
in which the Carduus–Cirsium–Rhinocyllus systems operate
have occurred over the last three decades that may aVect
the outcome (“absence of evidence ƒ” and “after this,
because of this”)?
5. Summary and future challenges and opportunities for
success
There are a number of things that biological control scientists can continue to do to ensure that biological control
remains the base strategy of integrated pest management,
and to quantify, predict, and minimize the risks of its use.
Biological control ethics has not often been discussed per
se in the context of programs. However, biological control
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scientists have always made conscious ethical decisions
when it comes to testing and releasing natural enemies. This
is perhaps more obvious and visible with biological control
of weeds because of the long history of host-speciWcity testing, but such testing for natural enemies used for biological
control of arthropod pests is increasing, and scientists are
communicating this information (e.g., Van Lenteren et al.,
2003). For example, lists of species to be tested against a
natural enemy are carefully prepared considering both target and potential nontarget species. When a natural enemy
is proposed for release after such testing, it is based on an
examination of the data collected during the risk assessment (host-speciWcity testing and a prediction of the likely
ecological host range). If a scientist cannot reach an ethical
decision that a natural enemy would be both safe and
eYcacious (i.e., “acceptable risk” is not demonstrated), then
a petition for release is not submitted to a regulatory
agency. Many natural enemies that a scientist feels would
be safe and eYcacious are not proposed for release because
the ethical test of acceptable safety cannot be demonstrated
by testing. Sometimes additional experimentation is conducted which produces data that allow a scientist to reach
the conclusion that the ethical standard of safety is reached.
If the data do not allow such a conclusion, the natural
enemy is dropped from consideration. Thus, when a natural
enemy is proposed for release, it is concurrence by regulatory agencies of an ethical decision by a scientist that is
sought. In short, every decision to propose release of a natural enemy is an ethical decision made by the scientist, based
on a careful, exhaustive examination of the best available
data.
ConXicts and risks of introduction of biological
control agents should be acknowledged and resolved,
without acting defensively. Biological control has been
practiced for over 130 years with minimal nontarget damage, and acceptable risk to most customers and stakeholders. Many pests have been managed with biological
control, although these successes can become “invisible”
and are not always appreciated or even known by
people who do not have to deal with the target pest as a
problem. At a minimum, risk analysis and BCA should be
standard procedures for future biological control
programs.
The science base of biological control can be increased
by developing and testing refutable hypotheses, and by
ensuring that monitoring and evaluation on the target
species and on potential nontarget species is the key postrelease activity. This will help us to understand and communicate the predictability of host range (“physiological”
vs. “ecological”).
Input from environmental groups and other customers
and stakeholders should be welcomed. Trained biological
control scientists should continue to lead the way in technology transfer of biological control products and agents,
but not prematurely. The tendency by action agencies
(State and Federal regulatory or land management agencies) to rush to distribute agents as widely and quickly as
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possible has ruined more than one long-term monitoring
research site. Closer coordination between research and
action agencies is imperative. Similarly, there are also tremendous opportunities for the augmentative biological
control industry that are not yet fully developed, and biological control scientists should continue to work with
industry to ensure their early and meaningful involvement
to risk analysis in program development. Biological control
scientists should also continue to take a major role in identifying habitat loss, invading species, and sustainable solutions to these problems.
In short, the atmosphere surrounding biological control
is increasingly one of challenge, and it is likely that these
challenges will increase over time (Delfosse, 2004). Therefore, for biological control to remain a viable strategy in
this new Century, trained biological control scientists must
change the way they plan, implement, transfer and evaluate research. New laws and regulations must be passed that
facilitate the release of safe biological control agents; regulators should be facilitators and not gatekeepers. Partnerships with customers and stakeholders of biological
control must increase. One deWnition of insanity is continuing to do something in the same way, and expecting a
diVerent outcome. Let’s hope that sanity rules in the new
millennium.
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